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Note
The International Rule of Law: An Analysis
Monica P. Moyo
On November 15, 1989, the United Nations General
Assembly declared 1990–1999 the “United Nations Decade of
1
International Law.” In that proclamation lay buried the
centuries-old hope for a just international order ruled by law
2
and based on the “rule of law.” Today, the rule of law is
generally thought to be the panacea for the irregularities and
arbitrariness that politics brings into social relations and
matters of governance. Moreover, although the evidence is
inconclusive, the rule of law is associated with the
advancement of ideals such as democracy, human rights, and
3
economic development. Thus, the rule of law is considered a
4
necessity for social progress within a globalized world.
Despite its popularity, however, the concept of the rule of
law is fraught with definitional and practical application
5
challenges. In a 2004 report on the rule of law, then U.N.

J.D. candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
thanks Professor Robert Stein for reading drafts of the Note and encouraging
her to submit it for publication.
1. G.A. Res. 44/23, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/23 (Nov. 15, 1989).
2. See infra pp. 4–8.
3. See generally Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, Competing Definitions of the
Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners, 55 DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW
PROJECT 5, 5 (2005) (indicating that despite the scant evidence that the rule of
law has actually resulted in these outcomes, between 1985 and 2005 the
international community spent over a billion dollars in rule of law building in
underdeveloped countries and transitioning democracies). See also Tor Krever,
The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World
Bank’s Development Model, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 294 (2011).
4. See generally PHILIP ALLOTT, TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF
LAW: ESSAYS IN INTEGRATED CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2005) (discussing the
possibilities of an internationalized rule of law).
5. See id. for a discussion of how some of the definitional challenges of
the concept can be attributed to the varying lenses through which
practitioners viewed the concept during their respective periods in history. For
example, post-Communism practitioners viewed the rule of law in terms of the
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Secretary General, Kofi Annan, noted the need for a “common
understanding” of the concept and the need to promote it at
6
both
international
and
national
levels.
Calls
to
internationalize the rule of law are often uncritically premised
on the assumption that the concept can be applied similarly in
national and international systems alike despite their
structural, political, and legal differences. The practical
challenges of applying the concept to the international arena
7
are amply documented, so scholars and practitioners often
focus their efforts and analyses on how international structures
might be adjusted to make such structures more receptive to
the diffusion of the norm. Beyond trying to explain its
elements, scholars have done little to understand and explain
8
what Thomas Carothers termed the norm’s “essence” and what
impact this might have on its application.
This Note seeks to explain the essence of the concept of the
9
“international rule of law” and how it might be effectively
applied in inter-state relations. Section I outlines the
definitional challenges associated with the rule of law generally
and the problem with its international application. Section II
deconstructs the concept of the rule of law, analyzes its
problematic assumptions, and explains how these assumptions
are in conflict with what is known about the structure of the
international system. Section III argues that a significant
obstacle to the realization of an international rule of law is the
concept’s lack of a theory of justice, and offers a socio-legal
framework within which such a theory might be implemented.
Although many aspects of this Note’s critique can be applied to
the domestic arena, its focus is international.
institutions in need of reform and emphasized institutions in their definitions
of the concept. In Latin America the focus was on judicial reform, while
proponents in Eastern Europe emphasized legal change and, later, rule of law
institution reform.
6. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616* (Aug. 23, 2004)
(“U.N. Secretary-General”) (noting the multiplicity of definitions associated
with the concept and the overlap with security sector reform at the operational
level).
7. See infra p. 11 and note 37 and accompanying text.
8. Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of
Knowledge, 34 DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW PROJECT 5, 8 (2003) (noting
that “practitioners know what the rule of law is supposed to look like in
practice, but they are less certain what the essence of the rule of law is”).
9. Throughout this Note, the phrase “international rule of law” will be
used to refer to how the concept of the rule of law is understood and applied in
inter-state relations.
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UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RULE OF LAW

A. DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW
Articulations of the rule of law can be found as early as the
10
medieval period. Most modern conceptions of the idea can be
traced to the writings of Albert Venn Dicey, the scholar
11
credited with coining the term. Although Dicey offered a view
of the rule of law within the international arena, he situated
12
his understanding primarily within the domestic, and most
theorists have done the same. The idea of an internationalized
13
rule of law, therefore, is in many ways an emerging norm.
At the heart of the challenge of internationalizing the rule
of law is the fact that, despite its long history and popularity in
both legal and political discourse, the very idea of the rule of
14
law remains vague and uncertain. Judith Shklar referred to it
as “a bit of ruling class chatter” which had become
“meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over15
use.” Others have argued that the concept has wide
theoretical acceptance precisely because its meaning is unclear
16
in practice.
Dicey argued that the rule of law has three essential
10. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Origins of the Rule of Law, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 162 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed., 1960).
11. See H. W. Arndt, The Origins of Dicey’s Concept of the “Rule of Law,”
31 THE AUSTRALIAN L. J. 117 (1957).
12. RICHARD A. COSGROVE, THE RULE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DICEY,
VICTORIAN JURIST (1987).
13. See Stéphane Beaulac, The Rule of Law in International Law Today,
in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 220 (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker
eds., 2009) (describing “an emerging ‘international rule of law’, in terms of the
externalisation of rule of law values”); see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE
RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91, 127 (2004) (noting that the
international rule of law “has only just begun”).
14. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210–229 (Joseph Raz ed., 1979). See also,
Olufemi Taiwo, The Rule of Law: The New Leviathan?, 12 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 151, 154 (1999) (noting that “[i]t is very difficult to talk about
the 'rule of law'. There are almost as many conceptions of the rule of law as
there are people defending it”).
15. Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE
OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan
eds., 1987).
16. Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
331, 331–361 (2008).
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components: (1) the regulation of government power, (2)
equality before the law, and (3) the presence of an effective
17
judicial system. This view has become associated with all
formal understandings of the rule of law and is often the
foundation upon which other, more substantive understandings
18
of the concept are built. While the formal aspects of the
concept focus on Dicey’s three elements, the substantive
19
aspects focus on the content of the law itself. Given the wide
spectrum of understandings within these two categories,
scholars have created a continuum that runs from “thin” to
“thick.” The thin or formal conceptions include elements such
as “rule by law” or “formal legality,” and the thick include
20
individual rights or matters of dignity and justice.
A number of normative principles have been used to define
the thick or substantive understanding of the rule of law,
including fairness in adjudication, clarity of law, limitation of
discretion, ability to resolve civil disputes appropriately, and
21
equal application of law.
Other elements of a thick
understanding of the rule of law include respect for
22
international law as well as moral values such as the
preservation of the “dignity, equality, and human rights of all
23
persons.” In light of the multiplicity of views of the concept,
17. COSGROVE, supra note 12.
18. See, e.g., Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, The Rule of Law, Remarks to
the American Bar Association, C-SPAN (Aug. 5, 2006), http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/193757-1 (echoing Dicey’s principles, but also noting
that in conceptions of the rule of law, the law must also “respect and preserve
the dignity, equality, and human rights of all persons”).
19. See, e.g., Lord Bingham, Lecture at the Center for Public Law: The
Rule of Law, CPL (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk
/past_activities/the_rule_of_law_text_transcript.php.
20. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 91. See also Randall Peerenboom,
Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE
AND THE US 1 (Randall Peerenboom ed. 2004).
21. Bingham, supra note 19.
22. Id.
th
23. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 20 Sultan Azlan Shah Law Lecture in
Kualar Lumpur, Malaysia: Written Constitutions and the Common Law
Tradition 11 (Aug. 10, 2006). See also Mark Ellis, Toward a Common Ground
Definition of the Rule of Law Incorporating Substantive Principles of Justice,
72 U. PITT. L. REV. 191, 199 (2010) (noting the need for respect of fundamental
rights and arguing that “a country that has a solid institutional legal
framework but fails to protect fundamental human rights is at best a country
ruled by the law but should not be considered a country based on the rule of
law”) (emphasis added). There is continued disagreement as to whether these
are elements or by-products of the rule of law. See, e.g., Hans Corell, A
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24

some scholars have held that the rule of law is an ideal rather
25
than something to be attained. Support for the rule of law as a
political ideal is found among those concerned with its
26
manifestation in inter-state relations. In international affairs,
one must ask which of the myriad views of the concept is best
for the international order and who should make this
determination.
B. UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
To determine the meaning of the rule of law in
international affairs, it is important to examine the U.N.
Charter–the multilateral instrument and constitutive
document upon which the post-World War II international
27
order is established. Although the phrase “rule of law” is not
found in the provisions of the Charter, the principle is found in
the Preamble and presented as one of the four goals of the U.N.
The goal is “to establish conditions under which justice and the
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
28
sources of international law can be maintained.” The U.N.
Challenge to the United Nations and the World: Developing the Rule of Law, 18
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 391 (2004) (noting that the rule of law includes
democracy and respect for human rights). But see Krever, supra note 3, at 294
(noting that democracy and human rights are not part of the rule of law but its
by-product).
24. See generally, WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 282 (1951) (discussing the ideological connotations
that attach to the rule of law among democratic states and how they differ
from those under authoritarian regimes).
25. See, e.g., Robert A. Stein, Rule of Law: What does it Mean?, 18 MINN J.
INT’L. L. 293, 303 (2009) (arguing that the rule of law in a “purist sense, is an
ideal, a goal, something to be strived for. As an ideal, it is never fully
achieved”).
26. See, e.g., Chesterman, supra note 16, at 360 (arguing that viewing the
rule of law as a political ideal “properly locates the conduct of most
international affairs in the political rather than the strictly legal sphere”).
27. See generally, U.N. Charter Preamble; see also, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). Declaration on the Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United States, G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 121 (Oct.
24, 1970), recognizes the inherent link between the UN and the international
rule of law. Its preamble emphasizes “the paramount importance of the
Charter of the United Nations in the promotion of the rule of law among
nations.”
28. U.N. Charter Preamble, supra note 27. The other three goals as
presented in the Preamble of the U.N. Charter are: “[1] to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
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maintains that “the concept of the rule of law is deeply linked
to the principle of justice, involving an ideal of accountability
and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the
29
prevention and punishment of wrongs.”
In his 2004 report on the rule of law and transitional
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, Annan presented a
view of the rule of law that is at once idealist, functionalist,
formal, and substantive, with an aim of making it applicable at
30
both national and international levels. Annan described the
rule of law as a principle of governance characterized by the
following: accountability of all actors, public promulgation of
law, equal enforcement, independent adjudication, consistency
with international human rights norms and standards, legal
31
certainty, procedural and legal transparency, and so on.
Bolstering the view that the U.N.’s understanding of the
concept is thick or substantive, Annan noted that the
normative foundation for the organization’s advancement of the
rule of law is the U.N. Charter, international human rights
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal
32
law, and international refugee law. These bodies of law carry
both concrete and aspirational norms, an attribute that often
undermines clarity and, in turn, the international application
33
of the rule of law. Annan noted that the U.N. would promote
untold sorrow to mankind [2] to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small . . . and [4] to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom.”
29. What is the Rule of Law?, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW,
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
30. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 6, at ¶ 6 (noting that “the rule of
law is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission” and
explaining what it might mean and what additional measures may be required
to operationalize it).
31. Id. (The rule of law is “a principle of governance in which all persons,
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law,
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency”).
32. Id. at ¶ 9.
33. This is a particularly important issue because fragmentation, or the
problems that have arisen as a result of the diversification and expansion of
international law, undermines the clarity of norms in international law. For
comprehensive treatment of this subject, see generally Rep. of the Study Group
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34

the rule of law at national and international levels. This
vision was affirmed at the 2005 World Summit Outcome and at
the General Assembly’s 2012 High Level meeting on the Rule of
35
Law at the National and International Levels. Annan’s views
beg the question whether the rule of law can be applied
similarly within the domestic and international arenas.
Furthermore, given states’ preferences for systems with which
they are familiar, conceptions of an international rule of law
tend to mirror understandings of what the concept means
36
within a national system.
There are many problems associated with applying
domestic understandings of the rule of law to international
affairs. Judge Higgins of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) summarized the problems when she asked:
“How then, in this national model, should an
‘international rule of law’ look? First, there should be
an executive reflecting popular choice, taking nonarbitrary decisions applicable to all, for the most part
judicially-reviewable for constitutionality, laws
known to all, applied equally to all, and independent
courts to resolve legal disputes and to hold
accountable violations of criminal law, itself applying
the governing legal rules in a consistent matter. One
has only to state this set of propositions to see the
37
problems.”
of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, May 1–
June 9, July 3– Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006)
(“Fragmentation of International Law”).
34. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 6, at ¶ 6.
35. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 134, U.N Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 66/102, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/102 (Jan.
13, 2012) (“Reaffirming also the need for universal adherence to and
implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international levels
and its solemn commitment to an international order based on the rule of law
and international law, which, together with the principles of justice, is
essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among States. . .”).
36. See Frank Schimmelfennig, A Comparison of the Rule of Law
Promotion Policies of Major Western Powers, in RULE OF LAW DYNAMICS 115
(Michael Zurn, Andre Nollkaemper, & Randall Peerenboom eds., 2012)
(explaining that this is so because such similarities create “a legal
environment that they are familiar with and know to use to their benefit”).
37. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks at the United Nations University:
The ICJ and the Rule of Law (Apr. 11, 2007) (available at http://collection.unumc.org/view/UNU:2363).
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Unlike the domestic arena where it guides a vertical
relationship between a subject and a sovereign, international
application of the norm is particularly troublesome because in
international relations the norm must guide a horizontal
38
relationship between equal sovereigns. Jeremy Waldron noted
that analogizing states within an international system to
individuals within a domestic setting is problematic because
states are subjects of international law, as well its officials and
39
sources. Further demonstrating the depth of the conceptual
problem of an international rule of law, Waldron argued that
states are not human beings, but they exist for the sake of
40
human beings. In other words, international law is meant to
ensure the wellbeing of human beings rather than state
41
freedom, yet formulations of an international rule of law
based on a domestic analogy would privilege the latter.
The question of whether an international rule of law is
possible is inextricably linked to the traditional question of
whether international law can be said to rule at all. The former
question addresses whether the various elements attached to
understandings of the rule of law are possible at the
international level, while the latter addresses the efficacy of the
norms articulated in various international legal instruments.
Chesterman argued that when the rule of law is understood in
the core, formal sense, one need only consider the international
judicial systems and the processes of law-making to reasonably
conclude that “there is presently no such thing as the
42
international rule of law.”
Other scholars disagree. Beaulac, for instance, argued that
the formal aspects of the rule of law are, to a large extent,
43
already reflected in the international legal system. To support
this view, first, he pointed out the presence of norms having the
38. Chesterman, supra note 16, at 358 (adding that structural issues must
also take into account “the historical and political context within which the
rule of law was developed”).
39. See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 16, 23 (2007) (noting also that although individuals can become
sources of law within a municipal system through contracts, there are many
sources of law within such a system that are not dependent on individuals, but
only a few in international law not dependent on states).
40. Id. at 24.
41. Id.
42. Chesterman, supra note 38, at 358.
43. Beaulac, supra note 13, at 208.
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characteristics of law and providing certainty, predictability,
and stability to the system, and limiting the use of arbitrary
44
power. Second, Beaulac argued that international norms are
adequately created and equally applied among states, citing as
evidence the voluntary and sometimes widespread ratification
45
of treaties by states. Third, he argued that the international
system has “adjudicative enforcement of normativity,”
supporting this assertion by pointing out the existence of the
ICJ, which is capable of adjudicating all legal disputes between
46
states. He acknowledged, however, that this view of the ICJ
was “a mere illusion” given the limits imposed on the court by
state consent, but maintained that this is “not so bad” because
states do not have to give their consent on a case-by-case
47
basis. Acknowledging the limits of his chosen variables,
Beaulac argued that overall at the normative and functional
levels a strong case can be made for the existence of an
international rule of law, much like that at the domestic level,
but that significant challenges remain at the institutional
44. Id. (noting that “international law is regarded as true positive law,
which forms part of a real legal system, in which ‘every international situation
is capable of being determined as a matter of law’”(quoting 1 ROBERT
JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (Longman
Group, 9th ed. 1992))).
45. Beaulac, supra note 13, at 208 (noting, for example, that the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties is widely ratified and that even those states
that have not ratified the instrument recognize that they are bound by its
provisions because they embody customary norms). To support the idea of
equal application, Beaulac pointed to the fact that international law applies to
all states not just a few, with all members having the same duties and
obligations. See id. at 210 (noting that normativity requires the application of
law to all members, and finding that in international law the requirement of
legal objectivity with regards to political subjectivity is met). However, he also
defined equality as “whatever is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any
other; and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally so in the other”
(quoting E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS
(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1863)), but did not address the practical
challenges of the legal notion of sovereign equality. They chose instead to focus
on the codification of the norm in instruments such as the U.N. Charter and
the Declarations on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.
46. Beaulac, supra note 13, at 212–13.
47. Id. at 214. But see, Arthur Watts, The International Rule of Law 36
GERMAN Y.B INT’L. L. 15, 37 (1993) (noting that “such a purely consensual
basis for the judicial settlement of legal disputes cannot be satisfactory in
terms of the rule of law.”). For the basis of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, see Statute of
the International Court of Justice, art. 34–38.
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48

level.
Unlike Beaulac, political realists are skeptical about the
possibility of both a rule of international law and an
international rule of law. This is largely because realists tend
to ground their analyses not in the external indicia of the rule
of law but on the structure of the international system. Political
realists view the international system as anarchic and states as
49
entities driven primarily by self-interest.
Basing their
reasoning on presuppositions of neoclassical realism, some
modern legal scholars have argued that international law
serves the self-interest of states and it does not, on its own,
carry sufficient normative strength to compel states to act
50
contrary to their interests. Thus the international rule of law
is conceptualized as an instrumentalist construct with states
51
having no moral obligation to comply with international law.
From this perspective, the concept is unstable; it could be thick
or thin depending on the prevailing interests of the most
influential states.
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF
LAW
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the concept
of the rule of law is fraught with both theoretical and practical
application problems. However, the norm continues to be
48. Beaulac, supra note 13 at 221.
49. For a comprehensive treatment of political realism, see HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
th
PEACE (5 ed., 1973). In support of his views, Morgenthau presented six
principles of political realism: (1) politics is governed by objective laws rooted
in human nature; (2) interest is defined in terms of power; (3) power is an
objective and universally valid category; (4) political action has moral
significance; (5) moral laws of a particular nation are not necessarily the same
as those that govern the universe; (6) realism is based on pluralistic view of
human nature. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1979) (explaining the key propositions of neo-classical realism).
50. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (2005) (arguing that the behavioral features of
international law, particularly compliance, are “better explained by a theory of
self-interest than by the various alternatives”).
51. Id. at 202 (arguing that international law must be excluded from ideas
of moral reasons for compliance and noting that “[s]tates could have an
intrinsic desire to comply with international law for reasons other than moral
obligation. It is possible that even if states did not have a moral obligation to
comply with international law, citizens and leaders might think that the state
has an obligation to comply with international law.”).
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understood as fundamentally apolitical—objective in conception
and application—because of the belief that it facilitates the
actualization of some objective notion of justice. To suggest that
the rule of law is, in fact, a political preference or concept is to
say that as a regulatory instrument it lacks the stability
needed to ensure consistent and predictable outcomes in interstate relations. Thus, for rule of law proponents, “the fight for
52
an international rule of law is a fight against politics.” With
understandings of the rule of law pitting law against politics,
politics is viewed as representing the arbitrary application of
53
power based on the preferences of influential groups, while
law is associated with neutrality and, hence, the attainment of
justice. At the heart of this view is the faulty assumption that
54
the law itself is apolitical and embodies justice.
The following section challenges this assumption and
argues that the law is, in fact, political; it is neither neutral nor
55
objective and it does not have intrinsic value. By deduction,
the concept of the rule of law is likewise not politically neutral
as the law’s substantive content embodies politically motivated
preferences and interests, and any application of the rule of law
leads to politically influenced outcomes that may or may not be
just. Furthermore, this Note argues that presenting the
international rule of law as politically neutral creates both
conceptual and application problems.

A. THE LAW IS NOT APOLITICAL
52. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 4, 5 (1990), http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/1/1/1144.pdf (indicating also that this
fight is “understood as a matter of furthering subjective desires and leading
into an international anarchy”).
53. Id. at 6 (arguing that the rule of law among states, articulated within
the UN in the late 1980s was “yet another liberal impulse to escape politics”).
54. See John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 199,
201 (explaining how citizens come to believe that “law is a body of consistent,
politically neutral rules that can be objectively applied”). See also Hilary
Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 Am. J. Int’l
L. 613, 85 (1991) (noting that “[a] central feature of many western theories
about law is that the law is an autonomous entity, distinct from the society it
regulates. A legal system is regarded as different from a political or economic
system, for example, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality,
and is thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and
objectivity”).
55. Wade Channel, Lessons not yet Learned: Problems with Western Aid
for Law Reform in Postcommunist Countries, 57 DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF L.
PROJECT 3, 8 (2005).
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To be objective, the law needs to be both concrete and
56
normative. However, the more concrete a rule, the less
normative it becomes; too much concreteness leads to
arguments that the law is political (providing a defense for
existing structures) and too much normativity leads to
arguments that the law is idealist, with judgments of what is
57
desirable based on political preferences. Either way, legal
rules are inherently entwined with politics, making political
preferences a necessary component of law and subsequently the
concept of the rule of law. Koskenniemi reasoned that although
some politics is inevitable in the formulation of law, “it should
58
be constrained by non-political rules.”
The political nature of law is particularly apparent in
international law. The formation, content, and application of
international law reveal political preferences, interests, and
59
competing values. At treaty formation, states negotiate the
contents of various agreements based on their national
interests. The resulting content reflects compromises and the
values of the signatories to the extent that the views of all are
taken into consideration. International law norms are
characterized as hard or soft law, rules and principles, jus
cogens, and so on, based on the political choices of the states
that are involved in their creation, impacting the weight given
to the various instruments. Furthermore, although states can
be bound by customary law to which they have not
affirmatively consented (unless they are persistent objectors),
states are bound by treaty norms to the extent they consent to
being so bound, which is another political choice. Moreover, the
application of the rules will often depend on the forum in which
any conflict is resolved. The political preferences of the
reviewer (whether it be the Security Council or the ICJ, for
56. See Koskenniemi, supra note 52, at 7 (arguing that in the modern
view the concreteness of law is found in that law is understood as “an artificial
creation not a natural one,” and the normativity of law requires application in
spite of political preferences).
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. at 5.
59. The development of international criminal law provides a stark
example of the role of politics in the creation of law. See generally ROBERT
CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 144–179 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the problems that plagued the
lengthy negotiations at the creation of the Rome Statute and the lack of
travaux preparatoires documenting the reasoning and history behind
controversial provisions).
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example) will affect the interpretation of legal norms, much
like judges within domestic systems are often influenced by
60
political preferences in their interpretation of the law.
Although the manner in which various agreements are
created supports the idea of sovereign equality and the rule of
law’s principle of fairness in the creation of law, it obscures the
realities of unequal bargaining power and the fact that weaker
states often acquiesce to sub-optimal or unfavorable terms that
61
are disproportionally advantageous to more influential states.
The types of rules that thicker conceptions of the rule of law
might propagate, such as those embodying ideals of fairness
and justice will tend to have soft law status. They might be
absorbed into the system as aspirational norms, written in
vague language, viewed as progressively realizable rather than
62
immediately applicable, and lacking enforcement capability.
States ratify international human rights treaties, which are
60. See Hasnas, supra note 54 at 232 (“The law is an amalgam of
contradictory rules and counter-rules expressed in inherently vague language
that can yield a legitimate legal argument for any desired conclusion.”).
61. This is particularly true of free trade agreements. An example is the
impact of NAFTA on Mexican farmers. In this case, the 7% annual growth
that had been promised to Mexico at signing became only 1.6% as the US
continued to subsidize its farmers and use non-tariff barriers against Mexican
products. For a discussion of NAFTA’s impact on Mexico, see JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 64–66 (1st ed. 2006).
62. An example is the legal architecture of the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES
2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), whose language is primarily aspirational, in part
because of the recognition that economic development is a process. Except for
the minimum standard requirements, the Covenant leaves states with no real
enforceable legal obligations towards one another (though the norms are
justiciable within states). Another example is the manner in which norms
concerning the human rights obligations of transnational corporations are
developing. The U.N.’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
which might have aided in holding transnational corporations accountable for
human rights violations, were effectively dismantled by Special
Representative John Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy
Framework,”U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011), which presented such
corporations’ respect for rights as their responsibility rather than their legal
duty. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on the Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enter. with Regard to
Human Rights U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003); Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Guiding Principles on Bus and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy Framework”, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar.
21, 2011).
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arguably the moral core of international law, with declarations,
understandings, and reservations, which further articulate
their political preferences, and in some ways compromise the
63
robustness of the norms. This process often results in treaties
with unenforceable norms and dispute resolution that is left to
64
political rather than legal processes.
Furthermore, the
flexibility of the norms in much of international law arguably
reflects recognition of the primacy of politics rather than law in
international relations and states’ preference for the same. The
political nature of international law is, therefore, inescapable.
With the law itself being political and its validity as an
impartial referee of international affairs questionable, it is
difficult to sustain an argument that the rule of law is
65
apolitical and, therefore, a suitable arbiter. Even the three
principles that underpin the thin or formal understandings of
the rule of law—supremacy of law, equality before the law, and
an effective judiciary—are political preferences. These three
attributes have a veneer of objectivity, but they can only be
politically neutral if the law itself were so. As Zurn and
Reinhold noted, “even formal conceptions of the rule of law are
never politically neutral, because the rules about the rules are
66
as much products of power struggles as the rules themselves.”
This fundamental incongruity within understandings of the
concept of the rule of law makes its application to an
international system of autonomous political units, built on and
governed primarily by political principles, at best difficult and,
67
at worst, unjust.
63. See generally Eric Neumayer, Qualified Ratification: Explaining
Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 397,
401 (2007) (explaining the impact of reservations, declarations, and
understandings on the efficacy of human rights norms). An example of a
heavily reserved human rights treaty is the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, where the most reserved provisions (articles 2
and 16) arguably embody the object and purpose of the instrument.
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979).
64. Neumayer, supra note 63, at 401.
65. See Belton, supra note 3, at 810 (noting that rule of law ends are
historically and culturally determined).
66. See Michael Zürn & Theresa Reinold, Rule of Law Promotion and
Legalization Beyond the Nation-State, WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN FÜR
SOZIALFORSCHUNG, http://www.wzb.eu/en/research/international-politics-andlaw/global-governance/projects/foerderung-der-rule-of-law-und-verrechtlich
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
67. Koskenniemi supra note 52, at 28 (“The Rule of Law constitutes an
attempt to provide communal life without giving up individual autonomy.
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B. HOW SOVEREIGNTY IMPACTS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE
OF LAW
The international system is built on the notion of state
68
sovereignty, a legal and political principle that has been
described as the most essential quality of a state in
69
international law. Although the concept is plagued with
70
definitional problems, at its core it describes “the supreme
71
authority exercised by each state” in matters concerning its
territory. Sovereignty complicates the conceptualization and
application of an international rule of law by: (1) encouraging
the prioritization of national self-interest in state interactions,
thereby compromising the fairness of the processes of rule
creation and the substantive content of the rules and (2)
making compliance with international law an unreliable
indicator of the actualization of the rule of law. This Note will
address these in turn.
First, although it has been argued that international
institutions and the forces of globalization are eroding state
72
sovereignty, the reality is that the world is still not borderless.
Communal life is, of course, needed to check individualism from leading either
into anarchy or tyranny. Individualism is needed because otherwise it would
remain objectionable for those who feel that the kind of community provided
by it does not meet their political criteria. From their perspective, the law’s
communitarian pretensions would turn out as totalitarian apologies.”).
68. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY 3–4 (1999) (describing four types of sovereignty: international
legal sovereignty, which deals with practices associated with mutual
recognition; Westphalian sovereignty, which deals with political organization
and the exclusion of external structures; domestic sovereignty, which deals
with the formal organization of authority within states; and interdependence
sovereignty, which deals with the ability of public authorities to regulate the
flow of things across the borders of their state).
69. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 81 (The New Press 2000). See also, U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 1.
70. Much of the confusion stems from the complexity of deconstructing its
essential elements; for instance, who are its subject and authorizers? There is
also the difficulty of distinguishing the symbolic from the substantive
meanings. What is the difference between tyranny and sovereignty? For a
comprehensive treatment of the subject, see Richard Falk, Sovereignty and
Human Rights: The Search for Reconciliation, 5 ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY 29,
32–35 (2000).
71. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (9th ed. 2009).
72. See J. Samuel Barkin, The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty
and the Emergence of Human Rights Norms, 27 MILLENIUM J. OF INT’L STUD.
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States remain primarily responsible for their own territory.
States may have extraterritorial obligations in some
73
instances, but these remain limited and highly contested
74
depending on the area of law. Because sovereignty is designed
to protect statehood, it ensures that states will prioritize the
safeguarding and furtherance of national rather than collective
self interest in their interactions with other states. This has the
effect of compromising the U.N.’s goal of international justice.
Moreover, states, in their sovereign discretion, choose the
manner in which they will participate in any given legal
regime, if at all, a practice that tends to undermine the rule of
75
law.
A system of autonomous political units with no supreme
legislative or administrative authority also ensures that much
of inter-state interaction will be based on political bargaining
rather than on legal rules, and those with greater bargaining
76
power will tend to dictate the rules of interaction. Thus,
sovereignty empowers states to influence both the content and
application of the law itself. The result is that the law, which is
supposed to rule, often reflects the preferences of the most
77
influential sovereigns. Sovereign equality remains a legal
229, 232 (1998) (arguing that a “state’s need for certain institutional
structures to legitimate themselves can act as a significant constraint on
states’ final authority over their internal affairs”); but see KENNETH N. WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 158 (1979) (arguing that
interdependence is a myth that “obscures the realities of international
politics”). Within the European context, however, there is an argument to be
made for the relinquishment of essential features of sovereignty, including
free internal movement across borders and the use of a common currency,
through state participation in the European Union.
73. For examples of how extraterritorial obligations apply in international
human rights law, see CASES AND CONCEPTS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Fons
Coomans & Rolf Künnemann, eds., 2012). International environmental law
also regulates activities that might have an effect across boundaries. See, e.g.,
Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà Vu: Extraterritoriality, International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S.
Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 415 (2005).
There are also extraterritorial obligations in international humanitarian law.
Id.
74. Parrish, supra note 74, at 395 (discussing the exception to the general
presumption against enforcing domestic law extraterritorially in the case of
environmental law).
75. See supra notes 3 and 62 and accompanying text.
76. See Hasnas, supra note 54, at 232 (1995) (arguing that the law “will
always reflect the political ideology of those invested with decisionmaking
power”).
77. Id.
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fiction. In this context, a concept of the rule of law that claims
to be apolitical will inadvertently grant the practice of “rule by
the powerful” legal and moral legitimacy.
Second, because of its impact on both state motives and the
law’s substantive content, sovereignty makes state compliance
with international law an unreliable indicator of the
78
actualization of an international rule of law. Compliance out
of a sense of legal duty, even at a state’s expense, would
demonstrate a commitment to legal norms per se and support
the argument that there can, in fact, be an international rule of
law. However, selective compliance, on the other hand, would
undermine it. Although there is support for Louis Henkin’s
contention that “almost all nations observe almost all principles
of international law and almost all of their obligations almost
79
all of the time,” it would be a mistake to interpret it as
evidence of the rule of law, thick or thin, without assessing
patterns of compliance within their political context and
analyzing the content of the law itself.
Although the compliance question remains largely
unresolved, in practice, states’ compliance appears to vary
80
depending on the area of law. States may choose to follow
international aviation rules governing flights, for instance,
because the international political costs are low and the
domestic interest of ensuring that citizens are able to travel
81
internationally is high. At other times, they obey rules
because the political or, more precisely, the reputational costs

78. See Koskenniemi supra note 52 at 8 (indicating that international
lawyers have pointed out that “legal rules whose content or application
depends on the will of the legal subject for whom they are valid are not proper
legal rules at all but apologies for the legal subject’s political interest”).
79. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
80. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER , supra note 50, at 102–04 (arguing that
while the idea of doing “the right thing” may explain compliance with certain
treaty regimes, it does not explain compliance with trade and human rights
treaties, and noting also that cost-benefit analyses precedes a state’s decision
to enter into any treaty). But see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2602 (1996–97) (arguing that this
instrumentalist logic is limited; it does not explain the internalization of legal
norms in domestic systems through ongoing transnational legal processes).
The internalization of legal norms, however, does not empty them of their
political content. Thus, Koh’s view does not support the idea of an
international rule of law, which is based on objective norms that might
actualize the elusive idea of justice.
81. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 14 (1995) (arguing that nations “obey powerless rules”).
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82

of not doing so are high. For instance, when there is growing
consensus around a norm, a state may participate out of fear of
83
retaliation or being considered an outcast. States continue to
bend the rules or act contrary to them when their self-interest
so dictates. Thus, national self-interest, rather than loyalty to
international legal norms out of a sense of moral or legal
obligation, appears to be the single constant determinant of
84
state compliance with international law. The problem is that
the concept of rule of law presupposes compliance despite state
preferences.
The question that arises is whether there is a formulation
of the rule of law that is not only sensitive to the complexities
sovereignty presents, but one that can also be used to further
the purposes of justice as envisioned by the drafters of the
85
Charter.
III. TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
The fact that the concept of an international rule of law is
not apolitical does not necessarily mean the idea must be
discarded. However, it does mean that the rule of law must be
understood differently if it is to become fit for international
application. Because the goal of the rule of law is to realize
some notion of international justice, it must be grounded in a
86
theory of justice. The formulation of an adequate theory of
82. GOLDSMITH & POSNER , supra note 50, at 102.
83. Roger P. Alford & James Fallows Tierney, Moral Reasoning in
International Law in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 11
(Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2011) (indicating that traditional theories of
compliance present states as complying out of “a desire to avoid sanctions, as
well as by obedience to authority, utilitarian compliance, socialization,
reputational concerns, or norm internalization”). See also GOLDSMITH &
POSNER , supra note 50, at 165.
84. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER , supra note 50; but see, Alford & Tierney,
supra note 83 (arguing that moral reasoning plays a role in the decisionmaking of agents acting on behalf of states).
85. See supra notes 28 and 29and accompanying text.
86. See generally TAMANAHA, supra note 20 at 151 (arguing that
“whenever implemented, the rule of law . . . should always be subject to
evaluation from the standpoint of justice” and discussing, among other
conceptions of the rule of law, the various ways through which theorists have
understood justice as a component of the rule of law). An example of a theory
of justice that is yet to be operationalized is the “capabilities approach” in
Martha C. Nussbaum, Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global
Justice, 32 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 3, 4 (2004); see also AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 87 (1999).
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justice is a difficult task that is both philosophical and political
87
at its core. This Note does not attempt to present one. Instead,
because this is fundamentally an institutional design problem,
the Note focuses on the socio-legal cooperative or coordinative
conditions that would be necessary for the implementation of
any theory of justice that might be later developed or
implemented.
A. SOME ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS
INTERNATIONAL THEORY OF JUSTICE

OF

A

USABLE

The idea of finding the meaning of justice is a serious
intellectual exercise, which is often relegated to moral or
political philosophy and shunned by international lawyers
88
because it smacks of utopianism or “legal idealism.” Despite
the perception that such an effort represents a reversion from
89
90
positivist to naturalist legal thinking, it is nonetheless
important to know at what precisely the international rule of
law is aimed if its normative content is to become clearer and
made more effectual.
The theory might take the form of a document such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other General
Assembly resolution articulating broad principles and then
eventually branching out and developing into more concrete
norms in various instruments. First, it would need to identify
the ethical foundations of and the principles that underpin
87. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 179 (rev. ed. 1999); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 5 (1983); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 11 (1971).
88. See generally G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1983) (discussing the sources of international law).
89. Legal positivism is a philosophical position which emphasizes a view
of international law derived not from absolute principles but rather from an
empirical study of how states interact—the agreements states enter into and
custom are its basis. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
26 (5th ed. 2003).
90. Theorists adhering to this view, common in the 1600s, argued that
state practice and treaties could never be sources of international law as it
was to be thought of primarily as a part of natural law; the emphasis was on
what states ought to do rather than on what they did. See, e.g., SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI DUO [THE
TWO BOOKS OF THE ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE] 168 (William
Abbott Oldfather trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1931). For a contemporary
discussion of natural law see THE THREADS OF NATURAL LAW: UNRAVELLING A
PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION (Francisco José Contreras ed., 2013).
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international law. Second, although it is a widely accepted
principle of international law, the theory would need to explain
in greater detail the idea of sovereign equality and its
limitations as it tends to have a profound impact on inter-state
91
relations. Third, it would also need to articulate principles
explaining the idea of “fairness” and present criteria
articulating how it might look when implemented within the
context of specific international legal regimes.
Although it is unlikely that an intractable principle like
“justice” would be defined in such a manner as to garner the
support of all states, there are many aspects of the principle
that would. Controversy over the substantive aspects of
“equality” and the precise boundaries of extraterritorial
obligations, for example, will likely continue; however, other
principles such as liberty and opportunity would likely garner
immediate if not universal support. Within this context, such
tensions are not to be taken as evidence of the politics that
obstructs the actualization of an international rule of law, but
rather as a normal aspect of the political bargaining that occurs
92
in the process of norm creation, maturation, and diffusion.
B. INCORPORATING A THEORY OF JUSTICE
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RULE OF LAW

INTO

Adding a theory of justice to understandings of the
international rule of law would be beneficial to the
international system in several ways. First, it would help to
clarify the legal content of the international rule of law and
move it from simply being an emerging norm to maturity.
Articulating the precise goal of the norm would make it
possible to begin to formulate less ambiguous rule of law
elements. Currently, the ambiguity in descriptions of elements
of the rule of law makes it difficult to assess the norm’s
maturation and, more importantly, how to make it more
effectual. Measurement and assessment are particularly
important because the maturation of the norm could lead to the
creation of globally justiciable rule of law norms upon which
case law might eventually be built, further aiding the diffusion
91. See brief discussion of impact of unequal bargaining power on
interstate relations under Section II (A).
92. See generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International
Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 888 (1998)
(discussing norm diffusion in international relations).

MOYO Note

2/27/2014 6:10 PM

2014] INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: ANALYSIS

99

93

of the norm within and among states. Moreover, given that
the goals noted in the U.N. Charter already present an
94
understanding of international justice, the development of a
theory of justice would help to create and advance concrete and
usable standards that bring current understandings of the
international rule of law in line with the vision of the drafters
of the Charter.
Second, grounding the rule of law in a theory of justice
would provide a much-needed regulatory framework in the
context of international rule creation. Thus far, rules are
created in various fora with few checks for consistency with
95
other international norms. The result is the fragmentation of
international law and the development of self-contained
96
regimes. A substantive theory of justice would provide a filter
through which various rules of international law may be tested
for fairness and a way to begin to operationalize the thick
concept of the rule of law envisioned by the drafters of the
Charter. A well-articulated theory of justice might be a
particularly useful filter in the negotiation of free trade
agreements. Requiring that such agreements pass a rule of law
or justice test before they are deemed legally acceptable would
go a long way towards meaningfully leveling the playing field.
Third, adding a theory of justice to the rule of law would
likely grant the norm greater legitimacy, particularly among
weaker states. Although this alone is unlikely to change states’
practice of prioritizing national self-interest, it would create a
framework within which collective self-interest might become
embedded in the system in much the same way that national
self-interest is. This would, in turn, promote the U.N.’s vision of
97
international cooperation. Moreover, suspicions that the idea
of the rule of law is a political tool used to enforce the will of
the most influential states would likely be lessened if an
adequate theory of justice were made a core component of the
international law corpus.
The preceding benefits are, of course, only theoretical.
Given the high stakes involved, one of the most significant
challenges would be getting states to agree not only with

34.

93. Id.
94. See generally, U.N. Charter Preamble.
95. See generally, Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 33 at ¶
96. See generally, id. at ¶ 44.
97. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para. 1; art. 56.
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regard to the substantive aspects of the theory, but also on
other preliminary and highly political matters such as who
would be tasked with the drafting of the instrument. The
International Law Commission—the independent body of
experts within the U.N. tasked with codifying all the essential
principles of public international law, and filling in the gaps to
ensure continuity— would likely be the appropriate organ for
98
this monumental task.
CONCLUSION
As a norm, the international rule of law has the potential
to positively impact inter-state relations. However, simply
building institutions around it, while ignoring its conceptual
challenges, will do little to bring it to maturity. This Note has
demonstrated that although the concept has a fundamental
flaw in its logic, namely the denial of law’s political nature, its
greatest weakness is that it exists to promote justice yet it
lacks a usable theory of justice. Without such a theory, when
applied to international affairs the rule of law cannot attain the
goals of justice noted in the U.N. Charter. Instead, it easily
becomes what it does not want to be: a sophisticated form of
politics that perpetuates the imbalances within the
international system.

98. The ILC was created by the GA as part of its responsibilities under
U.N. Charter article 13(1)(a). It is important to note that although the
Commission is a body of independent experts, politics plays a role in their
election. Nonetheless, the benefit of using the Commission is that from its
inception its work has proceeded deliberatively and has been less influenced
by the priorities of governments. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (2007). Furthermore, when the GA
recommends topics to the ILC for consideration they become priority according
to Article 18(3) of the statute of the ILC. Id. at 176.

